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ABSTRACT
Non-Interference is an information flow security property which
aims to protect confidential data by ensuring the complete absence
of any information flow from high level entities to low level ones.
However, this requirement is too demanding when dealing with real
applications: indeed, no real policy ever guarantees a total absence
of information flow. In order to deal with real applications, it is often
necessary to allow mechanisms for downgrading or declassifying
information such as information filters and channel control.
In this paper we generalize the notion of Persistent Stochastic
Non-Interference (PSNI ) in order to allow information to flow from
a higher to a lower security level through a downgrader. We intro-
duce the notion of Delimited Persistent Stochastic Non-Interference
(D_PSNI ) and provide two characterizations of it, one expressed
in terms of bisimulation-like equivalence checks and another one
formulated through unwinding conditions. Then we prove some
compositionality properties. Finally, we present a decision algo-
rithm and discuss its complexity.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Formal security models; • Theory
of computation→ Algebraic language theory;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Non-Interference is an information flow security property which
aims to protect confidential data by ensuring the complete absence
of any information flow from high level entities to low level ones.
The concept of non-interference has been introduced by Goguen
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and Meseguer in [10, 11]. Since then, a large body of work has
led to a variety of definitions for different application contexts. A
systematic overview is given in [12].
In this paper we consider the notion of non-interference pre-
sented in [15] for stochastic, cooperating, processes expressed as
terms of the Performance Evaluation Process Algebra (PEPA) [13].
The property Persistent Stochastic Non-Interference (PSNI ) intro-
duced in [15] is based on an observation equivalence that relies on
the concept of lumpability ensuring that, for a secure process P , the
steady state probability of observing the system being in a specific
state P ′ is independent from its possible high level interactions. In
other words, we assume that the observer is able to observe any
execution path with its delays and also to measure some timing
properties like, e.g., the response time or the throughput. Hence
a system S is secure if any external observer is not able to dis-
tinguish the behaviour of S performing confidential, high level,
activities from the behaviour of the same system but prevented
from performing any high level action.
However, as extensively discussed in the literature, absolute non-
interference can hardly be achieved in real systems. In order to deal
with real applications, it is often necessary to allow mechanisms for
downgrading or declassifying information. The aim of our work is
that of generalizing the non-interference property PSNI in order to
admit mechanisms for downgrading or declassifying information
such as information filters and channel control. We are not aware
of any work dealing with forms of delimited information release in
the context of stochastic processes.
Related work. The problem of modelling information flow policies
admitting some forms of downgrading has first been addressed by
Goguen and Meseguer in [11]. The authors introduce the notion
of conditional non-interference which admits flows from a high
level of security to a low one through a controlled or trusted part.
The notion of intransitive non-interference has been introduced by
Rushby in [23] to formally develop a theory of downgrading for
deterministic systems. Indeed, the non-interference property is said
to be intransitive since flows from the high level to a trusted part
and flows from the trusted part to the low level are admissible
assuming that the trusted part takes care of controlling them, while
a direct flow from high to low is not allowed. In the context of
process algebras, intransitive non-interference has been formulated
by Roscoe and Goldsmith in [22] for deterministic CSP processes.
Intransitive flow policies for non-deterministic systems have
been studied by Mantel in [19]. A few years later Backes and Pfitz-
mann propose in [2] a definition of intransitive probabilistic non-
interference for reactive systems. In [20]Mullins presents a property
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named Admissible Interference for processes expressed as terms of
the CCS process algebra.
All the properties mentioned above are based on trace equiva-
lences and thus they are not suitable to deal with information flows
caused by possible deadlocks occurring in concurrent computations.
To cope with this problem, Ryan and Schneider in [24] introduce the
notions of partial and conditional information flows in the context
of CSP processes. Finally, Lafrance and Mullins in [17] introduce
the notion of Bisimulation-based Non-deterministic Admissible Inter-
ference (BNAI ) which is a generalization of the property presented
in [4, 5, 7–9, 21]. In [26] von Oheimb provides automata based
definitions for both deterministic and non-deterministic systems
and both transitive and intransitive policies. Downgrading in the
context of CCS processes has been modelled by some of the authors
of this paper in [6].
Contribution of the paper. We present a generalization of the no-
tion of Persistent Stochastic Non-Interference (PSNI ) in order to allow
information to flow from a higher to a lower security level through
a downgrader. We introduce the notion of Delimited Persistent Sto-
chastic Non-Interference (D_PSNI ) and provide two characterizations
of it, one expressed in terms of bisimulation-like equivalence checks
and another one formulated through unwinding conditions [3, 18].
As for PSNI, the property that we propose is strictly related to the
lumping of Markov chains since the observation equivalence at
the base of our definition relies on the notion of lumpability [14].
As a consequence if P is secure then, from the low level point of
view, the steady state probability of observing the system being in
a specific state P ′ is independent from the possible high level, con-
fidential, interactions of P . Then we prove some compositionality
properties and show the relationships between the notions of PSNI
and D_PSNI. Finally, we present a decision algorithm and discuss
its complexity.
Structure of the paper. The paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2 we introduce the process algebra PEPA and the observation
equivalence named lumpable bisimilarity. Property PSNI and its
characterizations are presented in Section 3. Section 4 introduces
our novel security propertyD_PSNI and gives two characterizations
of it. In Section 5 we describe an algorithm to decide whether a
PEPA component is D_PSNI. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 THE LANGUAGE
In this section we briefly recall the Performance Evaluation Process
Algebra (PEPA) [13].
Syntax. The PEPA language [13] consists of two basic elements:
components and activities. Activities are pairs (α , r ) where α is
called action type and belongs to a countable setA, while r is called
activity rate and belongs to the set R+ ∪ {⊤} where the symbol ⊤ is
used to denote an unspecified rate. Hence, the duration of an activity
is modelled as a negative exponential distribution with mean r−1.
The special action type τ ∈ A is used to denote the unknown type.
The PEPA language provides a small set of combinators. These
allow language terms to be constructed defining the behaviour of
components, via the activities they undertake and the interactions
between them. The syntax for PEPA terms is given by the following
grammar:
P ::= P ▷◁
L
P | P/L | S
S ::= (α , r ).S | S + S | A
where S denotes a sequential component, while P denotes a model
component which can be obtained as the cooperation of sequential
terms. We denote by C the set of all possible components.
Operational semantics.Table 1 shows the operational semantics of
the PEPA language. The component (α , r ).P carries out the activity
(α , r ) of type α at rate r and subsequently behaves as component P .
P+Q specifies a system which may behave either as P or asQ . P+Q
enables all the current activities of both P and Q . The first activity
to complete distinguishes one of the components, P orQ . The other
component of the choice is discarded. The component P/L behaves
as P except that any activity of type within the set L are hidden, i.e.,
they are relabelled with the unknown type τ . The meaning of a con-
stant A is given by a defining equation such as A def= P which gives
the constant A the behaviour of the component P . The cooperation
combinator ▷◁
L
is in fact an indexed family of combinators, one for
each possible set of action types, L ⊆ A \ {τ }. The cooperation set
L defines the action types on which the components must synchro-
nise or cooperate (the unknown action type, τ , may not appear in
any cooperation set). It is assumed that each component proceeds
independently with the activities whose types do not occur in the
cooperation set L (individual activities). However, activities with
action types in L require the simultaneous involvement of both
components (shared activities). The shared activity will have the
same action type as the two contributing activities and its rate is
that of the slower component. If in a component an activity has rate
⊤, then we say that it is passive with respect to that action type.
In this case the rate of the shared activity will be that of the other
component. For a given component P and action type α , the appar-
ent rate of α in P , rα (P), is the sum of the rates of the α activities
enabled in P .
The semantics of each term in PEPA is given via a labelledmulti-
transition system where the multiplicities of arcs are significant.
In the transition system, a state or derivative corresponds to each
syntactic term of the language and an arc represents the activity
which causes one derivative to evolve into another. The set of
reachable states of a model P is termed the derivative set of P (ds(P))
and constitutes the set of nodes of the derivation graph of P (D(P))
obtained by applying the semantic rules exhaustively. We denote by
A(P) the set of all the current action types of P , i.e., the set of action
types which the component P may next engage in. We denote by
Act(P) the multiset of all the current activities of P . Thanks to the
exponential assumption, the probability that a particular activity
completes is the ratio between its rate and the exit rate from P .
Underlying Markov Chain. Let P def= P0 with ds(P) = {P0, . . . , Pn }
be a finite PEPA model. Then, the stochastic process X (t) on the
space ds(P) is a continuous time Markov chain [13]. The transition
rate between two states Pi and Pj is denoted by q(Pi , Pj ) and cor-
responds to the rate at which the system changes from behaving
as component Pi to behaving as Pj , i.e., it is the sum of the activity
rates labelling arcs which connect the node corresponding to Pi to
the node corresponding to Pj in the derivation graph, i.e.,
q(Pi , Pj ) = ∑a∈Act(Pi |Pj ) ra
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(α , r ).P (α ,r )−−−−→ P
P
(α ,r )−−−−→ P ′
P +Q
(α ,r )−−−−→ P ′
Q
(α ,r )−−−−→ Q ′
P +Q
(α ,r )−−−−→ Q ′
P
(α ,r )−−−−→ P ′
P/L (α ,r )−−−−→ P ′/L
(α < L) P
(α ,r )−−−−→ P ′
P/L (τ ,r )−−−−→ P ′/L
(α ∈ L) P
(α ,r )−−−−→ P ′
A
(α ,r )−−−−→ P ′
(A def= P )
P
(α ,r )−−−−→ P ′
P ▷◁
L
Q
(α ,r )−−−−→ P ′ ▷◁
L
Q
(α < L) Q
(α ,r )−−−−→ Q ′
P ▷◁
L
Q
(α ,r )−−−−→ P ▷◁
L
Q ′
(α < L)
P
(α ,r1)−−−−−→ P ′ Q (α ,r2)−−−−−→ Q ′
P ▷◁
L
Q
(α ,R)−−−−→ P ′ ▷◁
L
Q ′
R =
r1
rα (P )
r2
rα (Q ) min(rα (P ), rα (Q )) (α ∈ L)
Table 1: Operational semantics for PEPA components
with Pi , Pj and Act(Pi |Pj ) = {| a ∈ Act(Pi )| Pi a−→ Pj |}. When
Pj is not a one-step derivative of Pi we set q(Pi , Pj ) = 0. In the
following, when possible, we will write qi j instead of q(Pi , Pj ). In
the definition of the infinitesimal generator Q of X (t), the qi j ’s,
with i , j, are the off-diagonal elements of the matrix whereas the
diagonal elements are the negative sum of the row non-diagonal
elements, i.e., qii = −q(Pi ). For any finite and irreducible PEPA
model P , the steady-state distribution Π(·) exists and it may be
found by solving the probability normalising equation and the
linear system of global balance equations:∑
Pi ∈ds(P ) Π(Pi ) = 1 and ΠQ = 0.
Another notion that will be used in the paper is that of condi-
tional transition rate from Pi to Pj via an action type α , denoted
by q(Pi , Pj ,α). This is the sum of the activity rates labelling arcs
connecting the corresponding nodes in the derivation graph which
are also labelled by the action type α . It is the rate at which a system
behaving as component Pi evolves to behaving as component Pj
as the result of completing a type α activity. The total conditional
transition rate from P to S ⊆ ds(P), q[P , S ,α], is defined as
q[P , S ,α] =
∑
P ′∈S
q(P , P ′,α)
where q(P , P ′,α) = ∑
P
(α ,rα )−−−−−→P ′ rα .
Observation Equivalence. We consider a bisimulation-like equiv-
alence notion for PEPA components, named lumpable bisimilarity,
that we previously introduced in [14].
Two PEPA components are lumpably bisimilar if there exists an
equivalence relation between them such that, for any action type α
different from τ , the total conditional transition rates from those
components to any equivalence class, via activities of this type, are
the same.
Definition 2.1. (Lumpable bisimulation) An equivalence relation
over PEPA components, R ⊆ C × C, is a lumpable bisimulation if
whenever (P ,Q) ∈ R then for all α ∈ A and for all S ∈ C/R such
that
• either α , τ ,
• or α = τ and P ,Q < S ,
it holds
q[P , S ,α] = q[Q , S ,α] .
Notice that, in contrast with the notion of strong equivalence [13],
lumpable bisimulation allows arbitrary activities with type τ among
components belonging to the same equivalence class, and therefore
it is less strict.
We are interested in the relation which is the largest lumpable
bisimulation, that is the union of all lumpable bisimulations.
Definition 2.2. (Lumpable bisimilarity) Two PEPA components
P and Q are lumpably bisimilar, written P ≈l Q , if (P ,Q) ∈ R for
some lumpable bisimulation R, i.e.,
≈l =
⋃
{R | R is a lumpable bisimulation}.
≈l is called lumpable bisimilarity and it is the largest symmetric
lumpable bisimulation over PEPA components.
We proved that for any PEPA component P , lumpable bisimilarity
induces a partition of the derivative set ds(P) of P into equivalence
classes that is a strong lumpability [16] for the underlying Markov
chain. Moreover, the aggregated process satisfies the property that
the steady state probability of each aggregated macro-state is equal
to the sum of the steady state probabilities of the corresponding
equivalent states in the initial CTMC.
Finally in [14] we proved that lumpable bisimilarity is a congru-
ence, i.e., if P1 ≈l P2 then
• (α , r ).P1 ≈l (α , r ).P2 for all α ∈ A;
• P1/L ≈l P2/L for all L ⊆ A;
• P1 ▷◁L Q ≈l P2 ▷◁L Q for all L ⊆ A.
3 STOCHASTIC NON-INTERFERENCE
In this section we recall the security property named Persistent
Stochastic Non-Interference (PSNI) for PEPA components which aim
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at characterizing classes of processes having no information flows
from high to low.
Property PSNI tries to capture every possible information flow
from a classified (high) level of confidentiality to an untrusted (low)
one. The definition of PSNI is based on the basic idea of Non-
Interference [10]: “No information flow is possible from high to low
if what is done at the high level cannot interfere in any way with
the low level”. Hence, the notion of PSNI consists of checking all
the states reachable by the system against all high level potential
interactions.
In order to formally define this security property, we partition
the set A \ {τ } of visible action types, into two sets,H and L, of
high and low level action types, respectively. A high level PEPA
componentH is a PEPA term such that for allH ′ ∈ ds(H ),A(H ′) ⊆
H , i.e., every derivative of H may next engage in only high level
actions. We denote by CH the set of all high level PEPA components.
A system P satisfies property PSNI if for every state P ′ reachable
from P and for every high level process H a low level user cannot
distinguish P ′ running in isolation or, equivalently, P ′ running
in parallel with any high level PEPA component that does not
synchronize with it from P ′ ▷◁H H where H is a high component
cooperating with P ′. In other words, a system P satisfies PSNI if
what a low level user sees of the system is not modified when it
cooperates with any high level process H .
In order to model a process P running in isolation we introduce
the special model component 0 and extend the syntax of model,
non-sequential, PEPA components as
P ::= 0 | P ▷◁
L
P | P/L | S .
We model a process P running in isolation or, equivalently, run-
ning in parallel with any high level PEPA component that does not
synchronize with it as (P ▷◁H 0). Now observe that high level inter-
actions are not visible by an external low level observer which is
only aware of the delay while the interactions take place. Therefore,
from the low level point of view the process (P ▷◁H H ) behaves as
(P ▷◁H H )/H .
We are now in position to formally define the property PSNI.
The observation equivalence at the base of our definition relies
on the notion of lumpable bisimilarity and this ensures that, for
a secure process P , the steady state probability of observing the
system being in a specific state P ′ is independent from its possible
high level interactions.
Definition 3.1. Let P be a PEPA component.
P ∈ PSNI iff ∀P ′ ∈ ds(P), ∀H ∈ CH ,
(P ′ ▷◁H 0)/H ≈l (P ′ ▷◁H H )/H .
Notice that (P ′ ▷◁H 0) does not engage in any high level activity
and then the derivation graphs of (P ′ ▷◁H 0) and (P ′ ▷◁H 0)/H are iso-
morphic as graphs with labels and edges. More precisely, (P ′ ▷◁H 0)
behaves as the component P ′ prevented from performing any high
level activity. We can thus express the behaviour of (P ′ ▷◁H 0) by
using the restriction operator (\) as defined for instance in CCS, as
P \ H . From now on we use the notation P \ H as a shorthand of
(P ′ ▷◁H 0)/H . The definition of PSNI can be expressed as:
Definition 3.2. [15] Let P be a PEPA component.
P ∈ PSNI iff ∀P ′ ∈ ds(P), ∀H ∈ CH ,
P ′ \ H ≈l (P ′ ▷◁H H )/H .
In [15] we provided two characterizations of PSNI : one based
on bisimulation-like equivalence checks and another one based
on unwinding conditions which demand properties of individual
actions.
The first characterization of PSNI is based on an observation
equivalence where actions fromH may be ignored. We introduced
the notion of lumpable bisimilarity up toH .
Definition 3.3. (Lumpable bisimilarity up toH ) An equivalence
relation over PEPA components, R ⊆ C × C, is a lumpable bisimu-
lation up toH if whenever (P ,Q) ∈ R then for all α ∈ A and for
all S ∈ C/R
• if α < H ∪ {τ } then
q[P , S ,α] = q[Q , S ,α] ,
• if α ∈ H ∪ {τ } and P ,Q < S , then
q[P , S ,α] = q[Q , S ,α] .
Two PEPA components P and Q are lumpably bisimilar up to H ,
written P ≈Hl Q , if (P ,Q) ∈ R for some lumpable bisimulation up
toH , i.e.,
≈Hl =
⋃
{R | R is a lumpable bisimulation up toH}.
≈Hl is called lumpable bisimilarity up to H and it is the largest
symmetric lumpable bisimulation up toH over PEPA.
The first characterization of PSNI is stated below.
Theorem 3.4. Let P be a PEPA component. Then
P ∈ PSNI iff P \ H ≈Hl P .
We also provided a characterization of PSNI in terms of unwind-
ing conditions. In practice, whenever a state P ′ of a PSNI PEPA
model P may execute a high level activity leading it to a state P ′′,
then P ′ and P ′′ are indistinguishable for a low level observer.
Theorem 3.5. Let P be a PEPA component.
P ∈ PSNI iff ∀P ′ ∈ ds(P),
P ′
(h ,r )−−−−→ P ′′ implies P ′ \ H ≈l P ′′ \ H .
Using the equivalence relation ≈Hl this can be reformulated as
follows.
Theorem 3.6. Let P be a PEPA component.
P ∈ PSNI iff ∀P ′ ∈ ds(P),
P ′
(h ,r )−−−−→ P ′′ implies P ′ ≈Hl P ′′ .
Example 3.7. The aim of this first example is to support the
intuition underlying the definition of PSNI. Let us consider a system
offering some public access to two types of customers: the first
consists of ordinary customers without any special privilege, while
the second is formed by the users with administrative privileges
who can access to some confidential information stored in the
system. A malicious user is not interested in attacking the system
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Ordinary Confidential
bH , α1
eH , α2
qcL, α3qL, α4
qL, α5
qoL, α6
qcH , α7
Figure 1: An unsecure system for public access.
while ordinary users are interacting since a successful attempt
would lead to an irrelevant leakage of information. On the contrary,
an attack while the system is in its ‘Confidential’ state may lead
to a valuable leakage of information. Hence, it becomes crucial for
the system to hide its operating state to low-level users at any time
epoch.
The model is depicted in Figure 1. High-level users can force the
system to move from the state ‘Ordinary’ to the state ‘Confidential’
and vice-versa with the actions bH and eH (standing for ‘begin’
and ‘end’, respectively). Once the system is in the ‘Confidential’
state, the high-level user interacts by means of the action type
qcH (standing for query at confidential state). A low-level user can
interact with the system in the following ways:
• Action types qcL and qoL (query at confidential and at ordi-
nary, respectively) functionally allow the user to understand
that the system is in the ‘Confidential’ or ‘Ordinary’ state:
for example, a request for service could produce a message
displaying that an update is being run if the system is in the
‘Confidential’ state or the expected reply otherwise.
• Action type qL allows the low-level user to interact with the
system without being able to distinguish its functionality
from that observed when the system state is ‘Ordinary’. In
fact, the action type qL is exposed in both state ‘Ordinary’
and ‘Confidential’.
It is clear that the system, in this form, is not secure. In fact, action
types qcL and qoL simply allow the malicious user to understand
its state. Indeed, the states ‘Ordinary’ and ‘Confidential’ are not
lumpable bisimilar for a low level observer since they expose a
different set of low-level actions.
Let us consider the model depicted in Figure 2 that is obtained
from the one of Figure 1 by suppressing the action types qcL and
qoL . The obtained model satisfies PSNI iff α4 = α5. If this is not the
case, the malicious attacker may infer the state of the system thanks
to the sequence of response times obtained by a set of queries. In
other words, the state of the system can be inferred not only by its
functional properties but also by its non-functional properties.
4 DELIMITED NON-INTERFERENCE
The notion of PSNI is too demanding when dealing with practical
applications: indeed no real policy ever guarantees a total absence
of information flow. In many concrete applications confidential
data can flow from high to low provided that the flow is not direct
and it is controlled by the system, i.e., a trusted part of the system
can control the downgrading of sensitive information.
In this section we show how our security property can be gener-
alized in order to obtain a notion of stochastic non-interference for
Ordinary Confidential
bH , α1
eH , α2
qL, α4
qL, α5
qcH , α7
Figure 2: A secure system for public access.
PEPA components which allows systems to intentionally release
some information.
To model downgrading we now partition the set A \ {τ } of
visible action types, into three sets,H , L and D of high, low and
downgraded action types. Downgraded action types are used to
specify the behaviour of trusted components interacting with the
system. We assume that the low level users cannot observe the
actions performed by the trusted part.
We generalize the notation expressed in terms of (\) in the pre-
vious section. Indeed, for a given PEPA component P and a set of
action types L ∈ A \ {τ }, we denote by P \ L the component P
prevented from performing any activity whose action type belongs
to L.
Delimited Persistent Stochastic Non-Interference (D_PSNI ) can be
formalized as follows.
Definition 4.1. Let P be a PEPA component.
P ∈ D_PSNI iff ∀P ′ ∈ ds(P), ∀H ∈ CH ,
((P ′ ▷◁H 0)/H) \ D ≈l ((P ′ ▷◁H H )/H) \ D .
Notice that this definition states that a system P satisfies D_PSNI
if whenever it does not cooperate with a trusted part, what a low level
user sees of the system is not modified when it cooperates with
any high level process H . Hence, flows from the high level to the
trusted part and flows from the trusted part to the low level are
admissible, while direct flows from the high level to the low one
are not allowed.
As in the case of PSNI , property D_PSNI can be equivalently
written as:
Definition 4.2. Let P be a PEPA component.
P ∈ D_PSNI iff ∀P ′ ∈ ds(P), ∀H ∈ CH ,
P ′ \ H ∪ D ≈l ((P ′ ▷◁H H )/H) \ D .
In this section we provide two characterizations of D_PSNI . The
first one is expressed in terms of a bisimulation-like equivalence
relation named L-Lumpable bisimilarity up toH .
Definition 4.3. (L-Lumpable bisimilarity up to H ) An equiva-
lence relation over PEPA components, R ⊆ C × C, is a L-lumpable
bisimulation up to H if whenever (P ,Q) ∈ R then for all α ∈
L ∪H ∪ {τ } and for all S ∈ C/R
• if α ∈ L then
q[P , S ,α] = q[Q , S ,α] ,
• if α ∈ H ∪ {τ } and P ,Q < S , then
q[P , S ,α] = q[Q , S ,α] .
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endFileL, α1
beginFile
L
, α2
req
H
, α3 encD, α4 τ, α5 okH , α6
beginErr
L
, α7
endErrL, α8
Figure 3: Unsecure database query.
Two PEPA components P and Q are L-lumpably bisimilar up toH ,
written P ≈HL Q , if (P ,Q) ∈ R for some L-lumpable bisimulation
up toH , i.e.,
≈HL =
⋃
{R | R is a L-lumpable bisimulation up toH}.
≈HL is called L-lumpable bisimilarity up toH and it is the largest
symmetric L-lumpable bisimulation up to H over PEPA compo-
nents.
The next theorem states that P satisfiesD_PSNI if and only if for
all P ′ ∈ ds(P) it holds that P ′ and P ′ \H ∪D are indistinguishable
with respect to ≈HL .
Theorem 4.4. Let P be a PEPA component. Then P ∈ D_PSNI iff ∀P ′ ∈
ds(P)
P ′ \ H ∪ D ≈HL P ′ .
We also provide a characterization of D_PSNI in terms of un-
winding conditions which demand properties of individual activities.
This characterization of D_PSNI is stated below.
Theorem 4.5. Let P be a PEPA component.
P ∈ D_PSNI iff ∀P ′ ∈ ds(P),
P ′
(h ,r )−−−−→ P ′′ implies P ′ \ H ∪ D ≈l P ′′ \ H ∪ D .
Theorems 4.4 and 4.5 provide different characterizations ofD_PSNI
which naturally lead to efficient methods for the verification and
construction of secure systems. A decision algorithm for D_PSNI is
presented in Section 5.
Example 4.6. Let us consider the model depicted in Figure 3 that
represents a confidential query to a database system. Starting from
the left-most state, the system waits for a request reqH that uses
a private channel, e.g., a channel based on a asymmetric cryptog-
raphy. Upon the reception of the request, the system negotiates a
symmetric key that will be used to transfer the reply (encD ). This
phase is observable by a malicious user, but by using the down-
grading we are stating that we tolerate the information flow that
happens up to this point. The following τ activity represents the
computation of the reply. At this point, we may observe two be-
haviours: either the computation is successful or it is unsuccessful.
In the former case, the system transmits on the private channel the
acknowledge okH , then begins (beginFileL ) and ends (endFileL ) the
transmission of the reply encrypted with the shared key negotiated
before. For this reason, these activities are modelled by means of
endFileL, α1
beginFile
L
, α1
beginFile
L
, α1
req
H
, α2 encD, α3 τ, α4 okH , α5
Figure 4: Secure database query.
low-level action types. In the case of failure, the system transmits
an error message (beginErrL , endErrL).
Let us analyse the information flow in the system. Notice that
once a malicious observer sees the action type encD , he/she can
infer that a query has been started. However, thanks to the down-
grading, we consider that this flow is acceptable because we trust
the security of the system in this phase. In contrast, action type
okH is not protected (although cannot be seen by the malicious
user) since it is followed by a beginFileL action type. Therefore, the
observer can deduce the state of the query by inferring that it has
been successful if it sees beginFileL after encD , or unsuccessful if
it sees beginErrL after encD . Formally, this can be seen since the
states depicted by squares in Figure 3 are not lumpable bisilimilar
from a low-level point of view.
One possible solution to this leakage of information is shown in
Figure 4. First of all, we avoid the use of different action types for
signalling the error. This means, for example, that the error message
must use the same service (e.g., TCP port) as the correct reply
message. Second, it is important that the distribution of the size of
the reply and error message is the same (in our case proportional
to an exponential random variable with parameter α1). If this is
not the case, a malicious observer could be able to probabilistically
infer the reply the outcome of the query (successful, unsuccessful)
by the transmission time of the reply.
Here we prove some compositionality results that allow us to
check the security of a system by only verifying the security of its
subcomponents. In particular we prove that D_PSNI is composi-
tional with respect to non-high prefix, hiding, and cooperation over
a set of low actions.
Proposition 4.7. Let P andQ be two PEPA components. If P ,Q ∈
D_PSNI , then
• (α , r ).P ∈ D_PSNI for all α ∈ L ∪ D ∪ {τ };
• P/L ∈ D_PSNI for all L ⊆ A;
• P ▷◁
L
Q ∈ D_PSNI for all L ⊆ L.
We also prove that if P ∈ D_PSNI then the equivalence class [P]
with respect to lumpable bisimilarity ≈l is closed under D_PSNI.
Proposition 4.8. Let P and Q be two PEPA components. If P ∈
D_PSNI and P ≈l Q then also Q ∈ D_PSNI .
We conclude this section by showing the relationships between
the two equivalence relations ≈Hl and ≈HL and also between the
two security properties PSNI and D_PSNI .
Proposition 4.9 relates the bisimulation-like equavalence rela-
tions ≈Hl and ≈HL . The proof follows immediately from Definitions
3.3 and 4.3.
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Proposition 4.9. Let P and Q be two PEPA components. It holds
that
P ≈HL Q iff P \ D ≈Hl Q \ D.
The next Proposition gives a characterization of D_PSNI in
terms of ≈Hl . The proof is straightforward and follows from Propo-
sition 4.9.
Proposition 4.10. Let P be a PEPA component. Then P ∈ D_PSNI
iff ∀P ′ ∈ ds(P) it holds that
P ′ \ H ∪ D ≈Hl P ′ \ D .
Finally, we show how D_PSNI can be expressed in terms of
PSNI .
Proposition 4.11. Let P be a PEPA component.
P ∈ D_PSNI iff ∀P ′ ∈ ds(P), P ′ \ D ∈ PSNI .
5 A DECISION ALGORITHM
We briefly describe an algorithm to decide whether a PEPA compo-
nent having a finite set of derivatives is D_PSNI.
In [1] an algorithm has been presented for solving the label-
compatibility problem. The algorithm works on directed labelled
weighted graphs defined as follows.
Definition 5.1. (Directed labelled weighted graph) A directed la-
belled weighted graph is a tuple G = (V , Lab, E,w) where:
• V is a finite set of vertices;
• Lab is a finite set of labels;
• E ⊆ V ×V × Lab is a finite set of labelled edges;
• w : E → R is a weighting function that associates a value to
each edge.
Given V ′ ⊆ V , we denote byw(v,V ′,a) the sum of the weights
of the edges from v to V ′ having label a.
The label-compatibility problem is an extension to labelledweighed
graphs of the problem described in [25].
Definition 5.2. (Label-Compatibility Problem) LetG = (V , Lab, E,w)
be a directed labelled weighted graph and R ⊆ V ×V be an equiv-
alence relation over V . R is said to be label-compatible with G if
for each a ∈ Lab, for each C ,C ′ ∈ V /R, and for each v,v′ ∈ C it
holds thatw(v,C ′,a) = w(v′,C ′,a). Moreover, the labelled weighted
compatibility problem over G requires to compute the largest equiv-
alence relation label-compatible with G.
In [1] it has been presented an algorithm, named LCW (_), for
solving the label-compatibility problem onG and it has been proved
that the label-compatibility problem has always a unique solution
which can be computed in timeO(|V |+|E | log |V |). Herewe consider
the algorithm LCW (_) described in [1] where the initial relation is
the total relation.
The problem of deciding P ≈l Q can be reduced to a label-
compabitility problem. Hence, by Theorem 4.5 we immediately
get an algorithm for deciding P ∈ D_PSNI in polynomial time
with respect to the dimension of ds(P). This algorithm consists
of evaluating whether P ′ \ H ∪ D ≈l P ′′ \ H ∪ D, for each
P ′, P ′′ ∈ ds(P) such that P ′ (h ,r )−−−−→ P ′′.
However, we can improve on the above algorithm and reduce
the problem of deciding P ∈ D_PSNI to a single run of LCW (_)
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for D_PSNI
1: function DPSNI(D(P ))
2: Compute Down(P )
3: P = LCW (Down(P ))
4: for P ′
(h ,r )−−−−→ P ′′ in D(P ) do
5: if (P ′, P ′′) < P then
6: return False
7: end if
8: end for
9: return True
10: end function
followed by a final check. In particular, for a given PEPA component
P let us consider the following graph.
Definition 5.3. (Downgrading Graph) Let P be PEPA component.
The downgrading graph of P is the directed labelled weighted graph
DownP = (VDP ,L ∪ {τ }, EDP ,wdP ), where:
• VDP = {R | R is P ′ \ H ∪ D with P ′ ∈ ds(P)}
• EDP is the set of labelled edges
EDP = {(R,R′,α) | R
(α ,r )−−−−→ R′ with α ∈ L ∪ {τ }}
∪{(R,R, τ ) | R ∈ VDP }}
• wdP is the function which associates to each edge in EDP
the value
wdP (R,R′,α) =
{
q(R,R′,α) ifα , τ ∨ R , R′
−q[R,VDP \ {R},α] otherwise
Notice that the downgrading graph is not necessarily connected.
The algorithm LCW (DownP ) returns a binary relation P. In or-
der to decide whether P ∈ D_PSNI we have to check that when-
ever P ′
(h ,r )−−−−→ P ′′ is an edge in the derivation graph D(P), then
(P ′, P ′′) ∈ P. This test is performed by Algorithm 1 that computes
DPSNI (D(P)). The computation of Down(P) at line 2 can be per-
formed in linear time with respect to the size of D(P) by applying
the rules of Definition 5.3. Notice that the graphDown(P) has size at
most equal to the size ofD(P). Once LCW (Down(P)) has computed
the relation P the for-loop at lines 4-8 checks that the conditions
of Theorem 4.5 are satisfied.
Let EP be the transitions in D(P). The following theorem states
the correctness of our algorithm and evaluates its time complexity.
Theorem 5.4 (Correctness and Complexity). Let P be a PEPA
component having a finite set of derivatives. The algorithmDPSNI (D(P))
terminates in time
O(|ds(P)| + |EP | + |EDP | log(|VDP |))
and returns True if and only if P is D_PSNI .
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented a form of delimited persistent informa-
tion flow security property for stochastic processes specified as
terms of a quantitative process algebra, namely Performance Eval-
uation Process Algebra (PEPA). Our property D_PSNI is based on
a bisimulation based observation equivalence for the PEPA terms
which induces a lumping on the underlying Markov chain. The
aim of our definition is that of protecting systems from maliciuos
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attackers which are able to measure also the timing properties of
the system, e.g., the response time or the throughput. Property
D_PSNI implements a notion of intransitive non-interference: flows
from the high level to a trusted part and flows from the trusted
part to the low level are admissible since they are intended to be
controlled by the trusted part, while a direct flow from high to low
is not allowed.
In this paper we also deal with compositionality issues and prove
that D_PSNI is compositional with respect to non-high prefix, hid-
ing and cooperation over low level actions. The relationships be-
tween PSNI and D_PSNI are formally stated. Moreover, a decision
algorithm for D_PSNI is presented
As a futureworkwe plan to relax the definition of Non-Interference
by introducing metrics that allow us to measure the security degree
of a system in terms of probabilities.
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